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History provides a lens to interpret events shaping modern society.
It encapsulates perspectives from varying ethnic, religious, and gender
classes. These perspectives provide key analyses regarding the
intentions and movements of important actors and groups as well as
providing lessons for the "advancement of peace and prosperity" in
society.' Even though historians and scholars have compiled mass
amounts of information related to the timeline of war, the modern world
continues to be plagued by this phenomenon. War conflicts continue to
displace millions of individuals each year, forcing them out of their
homes and away from their families. For this reason alone, it is
important to analyze history to articulate a comprehensive
understanding of why displacement events continue to occur in the
modern day,2 and how the law can mitigate the consequences of
mass immigration.
The end of the Cold War3 led the world to believe that many
"displaced persons would soon be able to return home and . . . rebuild
their lives."' However, a declaration of independence from Yugoslavia
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Indiana University Maurer School of Law-Bloomington, IN; BA.,
2017, Michigan State University-East Lansing, MI. I would like to thank my parents,
Emir and Suada Dzubur, for inspiring me to write this paper and for motivating me every
day with their inspirational story. Additionally, I would like to thank my brother, Dzenis
Dzubur-we support each other every day in hopes of making our parents proud.
1. Amanda Caldwell, Note, Causes, Consequences, and the International Impact of the
War in the Former Yugoslavia, RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION, Jan. 2001, at 1 (2001).
2. Id.
3. See Rocco P. Cervoni, Note, Beating Plowshares into Swords - Reconciling the
Sovereign Right to Self-Determination with Individual Human Rights Through an
International Criminal Court: The Lessons of the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as a
Frontispiece, 12 ST. JOHN'S J.L. COMMENT. 477, 482 (1997).
4. Eric Rosand, The Right to Return Under the International Law Following Mass
Dislocation: The Bosnian Precedent?, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1091, 1092 (1998). See generally
Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADA, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed.
2007) (analyzing the framework of international refugee law).
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by Croatia and Slovenia in 1991' quickly led to a violent eruption that
contradicted the notion of return. The Yugoslav Wars created a massive
refugee crisis that formed a new precedent in international law.
6 The
term "temporary protection" first appeared in the European Union (EU)
during the Yugoslavian conflict: it was originally described as a "flexible
and pragmatic means of affording needed protection to large numbers of
people fleeing human rights abuses and armed conflict in their country
of origin, who might otherwise have overwhelmed asylum procedures."
7
Since the development of this precedent, not a single EU Member State
has granted protection under this status or even engaged in discussion
on its possible use.8 These discussions have failed to occur despite the
Syrian refugee crisis, which has proven to be one of the largest refugee
crises that Europe has ever witnessed. 9
Analyzing the past use of temporary protection status to shield
those facing "ethnic cleansing, massacres, mass rapes, and cultural
vandalism""o is fundamental in understanding how this tool can be
utilized to protect modern refugees, and why EU members have refused
to implement this status further. In other words, should temporary
protection status, considering the legal framework and the
socioeconomic effects, be granted to Syrian refugees? This note argues in
favor of granting temporary protection status to Syrian refugees
because the status (1) offers a recourse for displaced persons that would
not be covered by traditional legal protections, (2) produces quicker
results, and (3) grants refugees with basic human rights not currently
available in their home country.
Part I of this note describes how the ethnic tensions led to the
Yugoslavian war, which generated internal and external displacement.
Part II explains the EU response by setting a precedent for temporary
protection status and describes the advantages and disadvantages of
temporary protection status. Part III shows the modern picture of
temporary protection status, including its benefits and drawbacks. Part
IV illustrates the Syrian refugee crisis, and its similarities to the former
5. Balkans War: A Brief Guide, BBC: EUROPE (Mar. 18, 2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17632399.
6. See David Sopf, Temporary Protection in Europe After 1990: The "Right to Remain"
of Genuine Convention Refugees, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 109, 110-12 (2001).
7. Karoline Kerber, Temporary Protection in the European Union: A Chronology, 14
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 35, 35 (1999) (quoting Note on International Protection, UNHCR, 44th
Sess., at ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/815 (1993)).
8. See Helene Lambert, Temporary Refuge from War: Customary International Law
and the Syrian Conflict, 66 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 723, 745 (2017).
9. See Kim Rygiel et al., The Syrian Refugee Crisis: The EU-Turkey 'Deal' and
Temporary Protection, 16 GLOBAL SOc. POL'Y 315, 316 (2016).
10. Caldwell, supra note 1, at 1-2.
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Yugoslavian refugee crisis. Finally, Part V argues that just as
temporary protection status was granted to Yugoslavian refugees, so too
should it be granted to Syrian refugees today.
I. THE YUGOSLAVIAN PRECEDENT
The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was established in 1946
and re-formed after the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia during World War
II." The newly established Yugoslavia created six republics of Slavic
States and was occupied by Albanians, Bosnian-Muslims, Croats, Serbs,
and Slovenes.12 Initially, deep distrust stemmed from class deviations
between Croat elites and the Serbian people," followed.by conflicts
rooted in the religious transition of Bosnians to Islam.14 The conversion
increased the social status and wealth of Bosnians because the Ottoman
Empire rewarded individuals practicing Islam.15  The growing
resentment led to a lack of contact between the ethnic groups, which
further festered feelings of oppression and frustration.16
A fleeting moment of tranquility was felt under the communist
leadership of President Josip Broz Tito, " who ascended to power in
1963." Tito's political actions were mainly focused on suppressing the
tensions between the various ethnic groups:" "[h]e enacted a
constitution, [formed] a strongly centralized state, and reduced private
enterprise."20 However, progress was short lived, and tensions returned
when economic problems arose2 ' and the eight-member executive
branch could not agree on a comprehensive solution.22
National groups began to pressure the separate republics to assert
autonomy as a result of the continuous tension, which led to
declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 and
eventually Bosnia. 23 Slobodon Milogevid, the president of the League of
11. Balkans War: A Brief Guide, supra note 5.
12. Id.
13. Caldwell, supra note 1, at 3-4.
14. See Lisa L. Schmandt, Comment, Peace with Justice: Is it Possible for the Former
Yugoslavia?, 30 TEX. INT'L L. J. 335, 337 (1995).
15. Caldwell, supra note 1, at 5.
16. Id.
17. Balkans War: A Brief Guide, supra note 5.
18. Tito is Made President of Yugoslavia For Life, HIST. (last updated July 27, 2009),
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/tito-is-made-president-for-life.
19. Balkans War: A Brief Guide, supra note 5.
20. Caldwell, supra note 1, at 8.
21. Id. at 8-9.
22. Id.
23. Balkans War: A Brief Guide, supra note 5.
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Communists in Serbia, met these declarations with hostility.24 MiloSevi6
rose to power because of his strong assertions that Serbians were being
oppressed based on their religion and that anyone not fighting for the
Serbian cause was the enemy.25 He effectively relayed his message to
the Serbian people, and his rhetoric received large amounts of support.26
The Serbian people were readily united under one leader that could
"effectively fight their cause, [and] unite[] the Serbs throughout
Yugoslavia."2 7
On May 2, 1991, the first shots were fired in Borovo Selo, Croatia,
officially beginning the war.28 Homes were looted and burned to the
ground, and violence quickly took the form of ethnic cleansing
throughout Croatia.29 War atrocities consequently caused Croatia's Serb
minority to declare a third of Croatia's territory as their own." For
years, the one-sided fighting continued before Croatian authorities
gained enough resources to equip their armed forces and assert
dominance over their taken territory."
A pivotal moment occurred in 1995: Croats went on the offensive
and regained the majority of their territory, which resulted in
thousands of Serbs fleeing back to Bosnia and Serbia.3 2 The war
eventually spread to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Bosnian villages
and major cities were quickly seized.33 Within only a few days of
mobilizing, Serbs controlled sixty percent of Bosnian territory.34 Croats
also "attempt[ed] to assert dominance over large chunks of [Bosnian
Territory]" and even participated in secret meetings with Serbia to
devise a plan to divide Bosnia by region.35 'The conflict [quickly] turned
into a bloody three-sided fight for territories, with civilians of all
ethnicities becoming victims of horrendous crimes."36 Acts of genocide37
24. See Cervoni, supra note 3, at 482-83.
25. Caldwell, supra note 1, at 9-10.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 11.
29. Id. at 11-12.
30. The Conflicts, UNITED NATIONS: INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/en/about/what-former-yugoslavia/conflicts (last visited Oct. 13, 2018).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Ulrike Davy, Refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina- Are They Genuine?, 18
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 53, 55 (1995).
34. Id. at 56.
35. The Conflicts, supra note 30.
36. Id.
37. See Brenton L. Saunders, Comment, The World' Forgotten Lesson: The
Punishment of War Criminals in the Former Yugoslavia, & TEMP.. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 357,
357 (1994); The Conflicts, supra note 30.
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were committed all across Bosnian cities: Bosnian women were raped,
brutal detention centers were constructed, and disturbing intimidation
techniques were utilized-resulting in the death of thousands of
Bosnian-Muslims."
A. The Refugee Crisis
The violence and brutality occurring in the former Yugoslavia would
soon lead to one of the largest European refugee crises. At the beginning
of the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina was separated by three major
ethnic groups: "forty-three percent Bosniak, thirty-one percent Serb,
seventeen percent Croat, and nine percent other."3 9 These groups were
originally intertwined throughout the region, but the war would
separate them along ethnic lines.40 Ultimately, the war successfully
dislocated 2.3 million Croats, Bosnians, and Serbs from their homes.4 1
This number includes external displacement (movement of refugees to
non-Yugoslavian states) and internal displacement (movement of
refugees within the former republics).42 For example, "ninety percent of
the pre-war Bosnian-Serb population left the area now called the
Federation [local government mainly controlled by Bosnians] and over
ninety-five percent of the pre-war Bosnian-Croat and Muslim
inhabitants fled what would become the Republika Srpska ("RS") [local
government mainly controlled by Serbs] during this period."43 By the
end of the war, external and internal displacement only allowed "forty-
two percent of people [to] remain[] in their home of origin."4 4
The separation of populations along ethnic lines and the dislocation
of ethnic groups were mainly consequences of ethnic cleansing
campaigns.45 At the start of the war, these campaigns were justified
because they were part of a "premediated [military] plan" to gain control
over territory. - However, it quickly became clear that these campaigns
were developed to "purify" territorieS47 by "forcibly displacing [and]
38. The Conflicts, supra note 30.
39. Rosand, supra note 4, at 1098.
40. Id. at 1098-99.
41. Id. at 1092.
42. See Mark R. von Sternberg, A Comparison of the Yugoslavian and Rwandan War
Crime Tribunals: Universal Jurisdiction and the "Elementary Dictates of Humanity", 22
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 111, 121 (1996).
43. Rosand, supra note 4, at 1100.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1092-93.
46. Id. at 1093.
47. Sopf, supra note 6, at 110.
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killing members [of certain religious] and opposing ethnic groups."48
Refugees "were not the tragic by-product of a civil war; their expulsion
was the whole point of the war."49 They were displaced because of
intimidation techniques5 0 and were threatened with further violence if
they stayed.51
A severe housing crisis also contributed to the displacement, as
homes were destroyed and individuals were forced to move to
metropolitan areas.52 Homes in urban cities were distributed for
political gain53 and along ethnic lines, furthering the need for
individuals to search for new temporary homes.54
B. External Response
The massive refugee crisis forced European States to search for
answers within their current, inadequate system, leading to the
creation of an altogether new system. " Until the Yugoslavian crisis, the
only refugee protections available were the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees." The 1951 Convention protected the political refugees of
World War II,5 who were not expected to return home, and who were
typically given lasting citizenship in host countries.58 The host countries
provided these refugees with safe havens and gradually integrated them
into their country.59 The Convention required the following elements:
(1) the claimant left his country of origin, or a stateless
person left his country of habitual residence; (2) there
exists an actual risk of harm in the country of origin;
and (3) the claimant must prove a well-founded fear of
persecution. Other required elements relate to an
explicit link between the claimant's fear of persecution
and an internationally recognized human rights
48. Rosand, supra note 4, at 1093.
49. Caldwell, supra note 1, at 14 (quoting LAURA SIBLER & ALLEN LITTLE, YUGOSLAVIA:
DEATH OF A NATION 244-45 (1995)).
50. Rosand, supra note 4, at 1099.
51. Caldwell, supra note 1, at 14.
52. Rosand, supra note 4, at 1100-01.
53. Id. at 1101.
54. See id.
55. Sopf, supra note 6, at 111.
56. Id. at 110.
57. Id. at 110-11.




violation, as well as an objective failure of the State's
duty to provide protection to its nationals. In addition,
the risk of persecution must have a direct link to the
claimants, race, religion, nationality, membership in
particular social groups, or political opinions.6 0
However, the Yugoslavian refugee crisis presented an obstacle that
could not be solved by the legal framework of the 1951 Convention.6 1
The 1951 Convention was created for the displacement of small groups
of political refugees but was not adequately framed to handle the
displacement of millions.62 Moreover, Member States could not agree on
an interpretation or characterization of the war.63 In the early stages of
the war, many Member States viewed the conflict as a "civil war" and
were unwilling to classify the conflict as a genocide.64 Therefore,
Member States were unwilling to provide refugee protection to persons
escaping former Yugoslavia.65 This stance was justified by defining a
"civil war" as a generalized form of violence,6 6 where the "generalized
violence [is] not motivated by . . . race, religion, ethnic origin or political
opinion."67 Further stating, these persons were persecuted because of
the "general situation in their country of origin"6 8 and not because of
their personal traits.6 9
Another obstacle was the sheer number of refugees which led to
inadequacies in the Convention's framework.70 Great discrepancies in
burden sharing among European States were revealed-which had not
been previously visible when post-World War II protections had only
been extended to a small number of political refugees. 71
The strict position held by European States did not stop the need for
protection for persons escaping the atrocities of the Yugoslavian War.72
To provide protection and to prevent large amounts of people from
crossing international borders, the European Union adopted the
60. Id. at 122.
61. Id. at 110-11.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 111.
64. Id. at 111.
65. Id.
66. See PIRKKO KOURULA, BROADENING THE EDGES: REFUGEE DEFINITION AND
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION REVISITED 157-58 (1997).
67. Sopf, supra note 6, at 123.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 110.
71. Id. at 111.
72. Ree id
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"temporary protection status" legal framework for the first time.7 3 This
status was formed under two premises: "the obligation of a State not to
produce refugee outflows, and the right of people to return to their home
country."74 Under this new framework, States were presented with an
obligation to provide a minimum standard of care for their citizens, and
if their citizens were displaced to another state, the citizens had the
right to eventually return home.75 The "right to return" became a
human right acknowledged by the European Union and was used to
frame the discussion of temporary protection status.7 6 In other words,
returning refugees to their home of origin became the main goal of this
framework.
II. TEMPORARY PROTECTION STATUS
Temporary protection status combines two conflicting principles:
state sovereignty and humanitarianism.77 These principles were the
basis for the general legal concepts of the resolution when formalizing
temporary protection status.78 The resolution was designed to be a
flexible approach that allowed States to make decisions "based not only
on the humanitarian needs of the affected persons but also on the
situation in the Member States."79
In June of 1993, EU Member States passed a resolution in
Copenhagen ("Copenhagen Resolution"), which stated an intention to
grant temporary protection status to Yugoslavians that met certain
conditions. 80
The resolution8 1 not only specified who was to be admitted, but also
suggested various principles that Member States should consider when




77. Id. at 117. See generally GooDwlN-GILL & McADAM, supra note 4 (analyzing the
framework of international refugee law).
78. See Kay Hailbronner, Comment, Temporary and Local Responses to Forced
Migrations: A Comment, 35 VA. J. INTL L 81, 89 (1994).
79. Id. at 89-90.
80. Id. at 86.
81. The resolution states:
(1) Member States, in compliance with their national procedures and laws, will
take suitable measures for the admittance, within the limits of the possibilities of
each Member State, of particularly vulnerable persons from the former Yugoslavia
in order to afford them temporary protection.
These arrangements are especially intended to apply to:
(a) persons from the former Yugoslavia who:
[i] have been held in a prisoner-of-war or internment camp and cannot
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accepting refugees.82 It suggested host countries provide resources so
that refugees could have the opportunity to live in suitable
environments8 3 and suggested providing refugees with special benefits,
including health care and participation in local associations.84 The
Member States believed that refugees were allowed these entitlements
until the conditions in their home country were deemed "suitable for
their return."8 5
Prior to this formal resolution, only "a few Western European States
like Switzerland, Austria, and Germany" allowed entry on a temporary
basis for refugees.86 For example, Germany admitted 350,000 Bosnians
in March of 1995 (post-resolution).87 Even though this resolution did not
create a uniform standard, it did shift some of the burden to Member
States that initially refused to allow entry to refugees.88 Having the
European Union highlight its stance on providing greater protection to
Yugoslavian refugees forced Member States into action.89 However,
otherwise be saved from a threat to life or limb;
[ii] are injured or seriously ill and for whom medical treatment cannot
be obtained locally;
[iii] are under a direct threat to life or limb and whose protection
cannot otherwise be secured;
[iv] have been subjected to sexual assault, provided that there is no
suitable means for assisting them in safe areas situated as close as
possible to their homes;
(b) persons from the former Yugoslavia who have come directly from combat
zones within their borders and who cannot return to their homes because of the
conflict and human rights abuses.
(2) Member States will endeavor to administer such arrangements on the basis of
the overall objective that persons from the former Yugoslavia who are admitted to
the Member States and given temporary protection are to return to an area in the
former Yugoslavia in which they can live in safety as soon as the conditions in that
area make it possible to do so in safety.
(3) Each Member State will make every effort to take the measures required to
enable the persons concerned to stay on its territory temporarily within the
framework of the general objective referred to in point 2.
European Commission Press Release 548/93, Council Resolution on Certain Common
Guidelines as Regards to the Admission of Particularly Vulnerable Groups of Distressed
Persons From Former Yugoslavia (June 1993); Id. at 86-87.
82. Hailbronner, supra note 78, at 86-87.
83. Id. at 87.
84. Id. at 87-88.
85. Id. at 87.
86. Id. at 88.
87. Kerber, supra note 7, at 36.
88. Hailbronner, supra note 78, at 88.
89. See id.
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there was still no requirement forcing states to allow entry to displaced
individuals."
A. Possible Downfalls: Variation in the Interpretation
of International Law
Even though temporary protection status is premised on providing a
minimum standard of care for all individuals, its application comes with
potential downfalls. The Copenhagen Resolution provided European
States with a considerable amount of leeway in determining who
qualified for temporary protection status." European States considered
a variety of factors when determining status.92 Some Member States
only allowed entry to individuals from "designated areas."
93 Other
Member States "favored only specific types of refugees, such as the
wounded and sick, those who had been held as a prisoner-of-war or in
an internment camp, deserters, or the elderly."9
4 Additionally,
disagreements on legal procedure caused variations in admission.
95 The
variety of distinctions set by States made it difficult for refugees to
predict whether they would be granted temporary protection status
from a European State.96 This was extremely problematic because many
refugees were subject to possible ethnic cleansing or other forms of
violence and fighting if they stayed in their country of origin.
97
Additionally, granting refugees temporary protection status raised
issues as to what rights the individuals should be afforded." All
Member States allowed refugees to receive an education, but only up to
the secondary school level.99 Some states allowed for automatic work
authorization, while others required refugees to wait a certain amount
of time prior to receiving work authorization. 10 0 Additionally, States
differed on allowances for family unification and on what social services
should be provided.10 1 This brings forward serious questions regarding
what rights should be granted to individuals only staying in a region
90. Sopf, supra note 6, at 131.
91. Kerber, supra note 7, at 36-37.
92. See id. at 36-37.
93. Id. at 37.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 38.
96. See id.
97. See generally Rosand, supra note 4 (discussing how ethnic cleansing caused mass
displacement).






temporarily. Should they be provided with the full rights given to
States' citizens? Or are States comfortable with providing partial rights
to refugees because they are only expected to temporarily reside in the
State? The variation in rights also led to discrepancies in burden
sharing: States known for providing greater benefits received more
applications for temporary protection status and were burdened with a
higher cost.10 2
The final issue is to where refugees would return: "whether return
to other parts of the country [is] permissible, or whether return should .
. . take[] place at the original and habitual residences of the
returnees."'03 The Bosnian government specified the areas that refugees
were allowed to return, largely separated among ethnic lines.104
International law does allow for alternative settlement options when the
place of origin does not meet safety requirements,'o but when are these
requirements met, and when are they breached?10 6 What happens when
homes and cities are destroyed in a refugee's home country? Is it
acceptable to force refugees to leave a host country to which they may
have now grown accustomed?
The reality is many refugees will return to "'majority areas,' in
which people do not return to their original homes but to the areas of
their ethnic majority as designated by government."107 The concept of
temporary protection status was initially created to promote stability
and peace in former Yugoslavian republics.08 However, as refugees
returned to their origin countries and were forced into new homes,
peace was not felt and tensions were simply masked by
ethnic divisions.109
B. The Possible Need for Temporary Protection Status
"Temporary protection developed as a pragmatic answer to meet the
protection needs of a group of refugees hitherto not covered by legal
refugee instruments."o"0 Despite the limited protections provided,
temporary protection status serves as an immediate solution for a mass
102. Id. at 39.
103. Sopf, supra note 6, at 152.
104. Id. at 152-53.
105. See Alexandra McGinley, The Aftermath of the NATO Bombing: Approaches for
Addressing the Problem of Serbian Conscientious Objectors, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1448,
1473 (2000).
106. See Sopf, supra note 6, at 153.
107. Id. at 155-56.
108. See id. at 111-12.
109. See id. at 154.
110. Hailbronner, supra note 78, at 94.
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group of refugees."' Compared to asylum proceedings, temporary
protection proceedings are quicker and are more open to modification.
While flexibility may lead to predictability concerns, States may
construct a process that best fits their existing legal system while
ensuring their sovereignty.112 The system is tailored to the particular
State which will hopefully lead to a speedier immigration process.
In being granted temporary protection status, refugees are provided
with rights to begin rebuilding their lives such as working for an
income, education, and more."3 These rights are extremely limited
when compared to the rights of EU citizens but nonetheless may provide
more opportunities than those provided in a refugee's home country.
III. MODERN TEMPORARY PROTECTION STATUS
Modern temporary protection status was created by the Amsterdam
Treaty of 1999, which required the Council of the European Union to
issue a directive setting the minimum standards for temporary
protection status."4 This Directive was issued on July 20, 2001,"1 and
consisted of nine Chapters specifying how the European Union was to
deal with a mass influx of displaced persons.16 The European
Commission set a series of objectives that they hoped to reach with
the Directive:
[Tio satisfy the requirements of the Amsterdam Treaty;
to avoid an overloading of the national asylum systems
in the event of a mass influx and the resulting negative
impact on Member States and the persons involved; to
afford immediate protection and a fair set of rights to
displaced persons; to clarify the link between temporary
protection and the Geneva Convention; to contribute to
balancing the efforts made by Member States confronted
with a mass influx of displaced persons through
providing coordination facilities; and to achieve
111. See id.
112. See i. at 98.
113. See id. at 87.
114. Council Directive 2001/55/EC, T 5, 2001 O.J. (L 212) 12.
115. Scott Reynolds, Comment, European Council Directive 2001/55/EC: Towards a
Common European Asylum System, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 359, 359 (2002).
116. Id. at 360.
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solidarity in the reception of displaced persons, both
financially and in the physical act of reception."'
Regarding procedural requirements, the definition of a "mass influx
of displaced persons" was not quantitatively or qualitatively defined by
the Commission.'" However, it is generally understood to mean a
"considerable numbers of persons arriving over an international
border"1 19 at "a rapid rate of arrival." 20 Regardless, the meaning is still
established by a majority vote of the Commission and is decided on a
case-by-case basis dependent on the conflict taking place.'2 1 If the
Commission finds a mass influx of refugees in a State, then "the
maximum time limit [for temporary protection status is two years] ( ..
with the possibility of a one year extension)."22 Member States may also
choose to exclude certain persons from protection if the persons have
"committed crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the like, as well
as serious non-political crimes and acts contrary to the principles of the
United Nations."123
The procedure for return requires that Member States fully disclose
all relevant information regarding the refugees' status to the refugees,
so they have a complete understanding of their present situation.124 The
Directive prefers voluntary return but does allow Member States to take
a variety of measures to enforce the return of persons,125 as long as they
"consider any compelling humanitarian reasons that make[s] return
impossible or unreasonable in
specific cases."1 26
Despite the general and approved standards set by the Directive, no
Member States have implemented the Directive due to its underlying
issues. 127 There have been a few attempts to activate the status, but the
117. Id.
118. See Susan M. Akram & Terry Rempel, Temporary Protection as an Instrument for
Implementing the Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees, 22 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 96 (2004).
119. Alice Edwards, Temporary Protection, Derogation and the 1951 Refugee Convention,
13 MELBOURNE J. INT'L L. 595, 603 (2012) (quoting U.N. High Comm'r Refugees,
Protection and Cooperation in Mass Influx Situations, ¶ 3, UN Doc EC/54/SC/CRP.11
(June 7, 2004)).
120. Id. (quoting U.N. High Comm'r Refugees, Protection and Cooperation in Mass
Influx Situations, ¶ 3, UN Doc EC/54/SC/CRP.11 (June 7, 2004)).
121. See Reynolds, supra note 115, at 360.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 361.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 361-62.
126. Id. at 362.
127. Marco Notarbartolo di Sciara, Temporary Protection Directive, Dead Letter or Still
Option for the Future? An Overview on the Reasons Behind its Lack of Implementation,
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attempts have been squashed for political and legal reasons.
128 The
Directive requires a complex legal evaluation because "it rests on [an] . .
. ambiguous legal notion[]": the phrase "mass influx of displaced
persons" is impossible to define given the Directive's wide scope.129
Member States have differing perspectives on the meaning of this
phrase because their definitions are politically motivated.1' These legal
and political disagreements are amplified when combined with the
requirement of a two-thirds majority approval.'3 '
States also worry that the short duration of temporary protection
status makes activation not worthwhile.13 2 The Member States fear that
by activating temporary aid they will attract displaced persons to choose
Europe over other geographic areas.'33 They are concerned that this will
only worsen the current refugee crises before a concrete solution is
established,'34 therefore, only encouraging refugees to remain rather
than return to their home country.'35 Additionally, many refugees will
have forged ties to the community, which will stir a debate as to
whether these individuals should receive lawful permanent status.'3 6
IV. THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS
The possible need for temporary protection status is seen in the
aftermath of the Syrian Civil War. As of March 2019, Syria's Civil War
has generated one of the world's worst humanitarian crises: 5.7 million
Syrians have left the country and 6.1 million Syrians have been
displaced internally.137 In 2011, due to the Arab Spring, Syrians pro-
democracy activists started to gain hope that a progressive movement
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was achievable.138 The Syrian government quashed peaceful pro-
democracy protests in Syria by killing and imprisoning
demonstrators.1 39 As a result of this violence, in July of 2011, "defectors
from the military announced the formation of the Free Syrian Army."1 40
Syria's Civil War began as the Free Syrian Army worked to overthrow
the current government.141 Over the next couple of years, this conflict
spurned great instability in Syria, which allowed jihadist groups to take
over significant sections of the country.4 2 "The Syrian Civil War
thereafter became a multi-pronged conflict, with numerous foreign and
local entities interested in the outcome, including the United States,
certain EU countries, the Assad regime, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and
Islamic extremists."143
The conflict propagated a massive refugee crisis whereby "five
million refugees . .. fled Syria ... [and most entered into] neighboring
countries," and approximately seven million refugees were "displaced
within Syria."'" In response, the Turkish government enacted
temporary protection laws to safeguard Syrians escaping violence and
armed conflict.145
Article 91 of the 2013 Law specifies:
(1) Temporary protection may be provided for foreigners
who have been forced to leave their country, cannot
return to the country that they have left, and have
arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass
influx situation seeking immediate and temporary
protection. 146
Article 7 of Regulation No 29153 (2014) further explains:
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[T]hat beneficiaries of temporary protection may be
anyone 'to whom international protection status
determination procedures do not apply'. Today, persons
benefitting from temporary protection include all Syrian
nationals, Palestinian refugees, and stateless persons
living in Syria.147
Turkey has presented the Syrian people with an open-door policy
that encompasses the standards set out in the 2011 Directive.148 The
Turkish government has determined that the refugee crisis in Syria fits
the definition of a "mass influx of displaced persons" and that the State
has a duty to protect the refugees.149 As a result, Turkey is now hosting
over three million Syrian refugees,5 0 more than double the number of
refugees accepted by Lebanon, who hosts the second highest number of
Syrian refugees.'"' In contrast, the rest of Europe has "only extended
protection to ... 217,000 Syrian refugees."l52
V. PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION BY EUROPEAN MEMBER STATES
Despite the legal and political flaws of the 2011 Directive, Turkey
has continued to provide temporary protection status to Syrian refugees
facing displacement.15 3 However, European Member States have refused
to implement or even consider temporary protection status as a solution
to the current crisis.154 Procedurally, it is difficult to understand why
this protection has not been granted to displaced individuals. The 2011
Directive set broad standards and granted large amounts of discretion
to Member States.' The Directive's standards are likely already met
due to its broad scope: "[i]t is difficult to deny the existence of a 'mass
influx of displaced persons from third countries', as the current arrivals
constitute an inflow of unprecedented proportion made almost
147. Id. (quoting Regulation ('by-law') No 29153 on Temporary Protection-the
Regulation art. 7 entered into force on 22 October 2014).
148. Ineli-Ciger, supra note 145, at 557.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 577.
151. Major Yvonne S. Brakel et. al., 50 Years Was Too Long to Wait: The Syrian Refugee
Crisis Has Highlighted the Need for a Second Optional Protocol to the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 40 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK. L. REV. 51, 60 (2017).
152. E. Tendayi Achiune, Syria, Cost-Sharing, and the Responsibility to Protect
Refugees, 100 MINN. L. REV. 687, 689 (2015).
153. See Ineli-Ciger, supra note 145, at 557.
154. See Notarbartolo di Sciara, supra note 127.
155. See id. at 123.
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exclusively of persons seeking international protection."l56 The number
of externally and internally displaced Syrian refugees exceed the
number of Yugoslavian refugees by almost ten million individuals. 1 7
Therefore, the number of refugees does not appear to be a valid reason
for refusing to provide protection.
The overbroad legal framework may not be providing sufficient
guidelines for States. One solution is to provide States with a structured
international legal regime, narrower in scope, that better outlines
determination procedures, the rights granted to refugees, and
procedures for return. Stricter guidelines might pressure States to at
least consider granting this status. A newly narrowed scope and
carefully detailed status parameters, the European Union may actually
consider its application.
In today's political climate, temporary protection status would be
difficult to implement because States value their sovereignty, and the
European Union has been reluctant to aggressively interfere within a
State's border."' Beginning in 2015, Europe's close neighbor, Russia,
aligned itself with Assad's regime in Syria and provided considerable
amounts of foreign backing to the Syrian government.1 5 9 Arranging
protection to displaced persons who oppose the current Syrian regime
could create detrimental political consequences to European Member
States with close ties to Russia. States have historically prioritized the
needs of their citizens before the needs of others.160 However, Russia
was a close ally of Serbia during the Yugoslavian War and continues to
have a close relationship. 161 This relationship did not prevent European
Member States from equipping a significant number of Bosnian-Muslim
and Croat refugees with temporary protection status during the
Yugoslavian War.162 During this period, States seemed to recognize that
the severe violations of human rights constructed a duty of protection
that exceeded the political arena. It is difficult to understand how this
same duty is inapplicable within the context of Syrian refugees, who are
facing conflicts similar to those faced by many Bosnian-Muslims and
Croats but yet are not receiving equal treatment by the international
community.
156. Id. at 127.
157. See Rosand, supra note 4, at 1092; see Syrian Civil War Fast Facts, supra note 137.
158. See Notarbartolo di Sciara, supra note 127.
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160. See ERIC A. HEINZE, GLOBAL VIOLENCE: ETHICAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES 5 (2016).
161. See generally Lo-Paul Jacob, Keys to Understanding Russia's Relationship with
Serbia, NAOC (Dec. 1, 2017), http://natoassociation.calkeys-to-understanding-russias-
relationship-with-serbia (discussing Serbia's long relationship with Russia).
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Other underlying issues may be preventing European Member
States from granting this protection. They may believe that this
protection should only be provided to States within Europe. There may
be a fear that once these individuals enter Europe, they will have no
incentive to go back to their home country, though this same fear is not
recognized with European refugees. However, the Directive does not
require that refugees must arrive from a European state.
163
Underlying religious animosity and a misplaced fear of terrorism
may also be a deterrent. Yet, a majority of refugees during the
Yugoslavian crisis were Muslims-the main religion in Syria.'"
Arguably, a fear of terrorism did not exist in the Yugoslav era, or if it
did, it was not as prevalent. A fear of terrorism must be taken in context
with the atrocities faced by Syrian refugees. Currently, these fears are
allowed to fester under the flexibility provided to States; however, a
strict legal framework may force states to deal with the real and
prevalent problem of displacement and shift away from these concerns.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current Syrian refugee crisis requires the use of the 2001
Directive as a formal solution to displacement and necessitates trong
political support from the EU Member States. Historically, there was
support for providing temporary protection status to Bosnian refugees;
however, this support appears to have vanished with the current
refugee crisis. This support is nonexistent despite the drastic
similarities between both conflicts and the similarities between the
groups of refugees. This lack of support indicates a drastic change in the
way Member States are presently analyzing humanitarian crises and
viewing the resulting displaced persons.
Disregarding the current conflict and the resulting refugee influx,
goes directly against the objectives stated by the 2001 Directive. The
European Union should look to its legal precedent. Temporary
protection status should be granted to Syrian refugees because it offers
a recourse for displaced persons that would not be covered by traditional
legal protections, produces quicker results, and grants refugees with
basic rights human rights not currently available in their home country.
Despite the imperfections that underlie temporary protection status
proceedings, it is still a recourse that needs to be seriously considered by
the European Union and its Member States.
163. See European Commission Press Release 548/93, supra note 81.
164. Syrian Culture, CULTURAL ATLAS, https://culturalatlas.sbs.com.aulsyrian-culture/
syrian-culture-religion (last visited Nov. 11, 2019).
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